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ABSTRACT
Weused dual electroencephalography (EEG) tomeasure brain activity simultaneously in pairs of trustors
and trustees playing a 15-round trust game framed as a “trust game” versus a “power game”. Fourmajor
findings resulted: first, earnings in each roundwere higher in the trust than in the power game. Second,
in the trust game, reaction time for strategic deliberations was significantly longer for the trustee than
the trustor. In the power game, however, the trustee took longer to think about how much money to
repay, whereas the trustor took longer to think about how much money to invest. Third, prediction
accuracy for the amount exchanged was higher in the trust game than in the power game. Fourth,
interbrain synchronicity gaugedwith thephase-locking valueof alphabands in thebrain –especially the
frontal and central regions –was higher in the power game than in the trust game.We infer that this last
finding reflects elevated mutual strategic deliberation in the power game. These behavioral and
neuroscience-based findings give a better understanding of the framing effects of a trust game on
the strategic deliberations of both trustor and trustee seeking to attain wealth.
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“One of the limitations of conventional studies, how-
ever, is that they have mainly focused on aspects of
off-line social cognition, whereas most of our social
behavior is characterized by on-line mutual interac-
tion, forming a ‘two-in-one’ system…. The two-in-one
system in social communication is a complex non-
linear system…that cannot be reduced to the sum-
mation of effects in single isolated brains.” (Koike,
Tanabe, & Sadato, 2015)
Introduction
Social interaction and the formation of relationships are
of crucial importance for human survival and the col-
lective creation of wealth (Beckes & Coan, 2011;
Lieberman, 2007, 2013). Rather than studying persons
engaged in tasks in isolation, such as passively watch-
ing visual expressions in facial pictures of conspecifics
or interacting with a computer in an economic game,
researchers have begun taking a social neuroscience
perspective by investigating how individuals interact
with each other (Cacioppo, Hawkley, & Berntson, 2003;
Hasson, Ghazanfar, Galantucci, Garrod, & Keysers, 2012).
When people interact with other people as opposed to
making decisions alone, they essentially react thought-
fully and purposively to another person’s behavior and
the intentions or strategies underlying that behavior.
This is reflected in the relationship arising between the
subject and the person they are interacting with, which
cannot be simply described by behavioral data
(Babiloni & Astolfi, 2014). For neuroscientists interested
in electroencephalography (EEG), this requires direct
observation of the “interaction” emerging between
the brains of different subjects, which can only be
obtained by measuring the subjects’ brain activities
simultaneously during tasks (Babiloni & Astolfi, 2014,
p. 77). Hence, researchers use dual EEG or hyperscan-
ning EEG (e.g., Keller, Novembre, & Hove, 2014; Mu,
Guo, & Han, 2016; Schilbach et al., 2013) when studying
the degree of interbrain synchronicity during social
tasks. Similar developments are happening in fMRI-
based research, e.g., King-Casas et al. (2005).
Most studies of dual EEG focus on simple coordina-
tion tasks, especially motor tasks such as button press-
ing, temporal synchronicity during music production,
transmitting gestural words or emotions by facial
expression, and synchronicity of hand movements (see
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Babiloni & Astolfi, 2014; Dumas, Nadel, Soussignan,
Martinerie, & Garnero, 2010; Kawasaki, Yamada,
Ushiku, Miyauchi, & Yamaguchi, 2013). It is apparent
that during coordination tasks, interbrain synchronicity
occurs mainly between the prefrontal cortices as these
regions are involved in perspective-taking and theory of
mind (e.g., Cui, Bryant, & Reiss, 2012; Ruby & Decety,
2004; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003).
In addition, alpha bands are found to be especially
involved in social tasks (Astolfi et al., 2010; Tognoli,
Lagarde, DeGuzman, & Kelso, 2007). Here, different pat-
terns of alpha band-interbrain synchronicity (e.g., high
versus low interbrain synchronicity) are associated with
the temporal dynamics of interpersonal coordination
such as found in cooperation versus competition
tasks. We focus on a coordination task involving strate-
gic decision-making, during which the value associated
with the action of one agent depends critically on the
fluctuating actions and mental states of other social
agents.
We chose to focus on a well-known economic game,
the iterative trust game, in which a participant (the
trustor) is given a certain amount of money as the
endowment at the beginning of each round. The parti-
cipant then decides how much money to share with
another participant (the trustee). The money shared is
multiplied by three, after which the trustee decides
how much of the money received to give back to the
trustor (Cesarini et al., 2008). This paradigm studies two
players (trustor and trustee) who send money back and
forth, which entails risk and requires trust from both
players (e.g., King-Cases et al., 2005, p. 78). Trust is
usually operationalized as the amount of money
a sender gives to the receiver without external enforce-
ment (King-Casas et al., 2005, p. 78). Actually, King-
Casas et al. (2005) used the trust game to gauge brain
synchronicity between two economic actors and
focused on specific epochs of interest (e.g., reciprocal
behavior predicts trust) which could reveal significant
information about people’s strategic thinking.
In previous studies using the trust game, experimental
manipulations (such as the identity of the trustee, feeling of
conflict, the stages in the game, etc.) and background
characteristics (such as social status, nationality, etc.) influ-
enced different behavioral measures like earnings, reaction
time, and prediction accuracy. Delgado, Frank, and Phelps
(2005) found that trustors weremore likely to share than to
keep money when playing with a trustee who was defined
as “morally good”, and needed less time to decide to share
money with the “morally good trustee”. Evans, Dillon, and
Rand (2015) reported that trustees felt most conflicted
when trustors transferred an intermediate amount of
money, as they couldn’t conclude the intentions or
cooperative motivations of the trustors’ decisions. And
trustees who felt more conflicted took longer to decide
how much money to give back. Glaeser, Laibson,
Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) indicated that subjects
who were members of volunteer organizations or had
more friends tended to earn more money in the trust
game. Willinger, Keser, Lohmann, and Usunier (2003) inves-
tigated the effect of the player’s nationality when playing
the trust game, and revealed that German trustees earned
significantly more than French trustees. In King-Casas’s
study (King-Casas et al., 2005), the trustees’ prediction
accuracy was lower during early rounds of the trust game
but became higher in later rounds as the game progressed.
Consistent with these previous studies using the trust
game, we will use earnings, reaction time, and prediction
accuracy as behavioral measures.
We focus specifically on interbrain synchronicity of
pairs engaged in the trust game framed as either a “trust
game” or a “power game” (e.g., Burnham, McCabe, &
Smith, 2000; Johnson & Mislin, 2011). We framed the
trust game as a trust or power game to the participants
by showing either “You are entering a TRUST GAME” or
“You are entering a POWERGAME” at the beginning of the
experiment, and keeping the rest of the design identical.
The effects of the power prime on brain activation have
already been investigated using traditional single-subject
EEG (Boksem, Smolders, & De Cremer, 2012; Galang &
Obhi, 2018; Guinote, 2017) but not in a dual EEG setting.
We aim to understand how framing this trust game as
a trust versus power game affects the strategic delibera-
tions of both trustor and trustee. Their deliberations
involvemaking predictions about each other’s exchanges,
perspective-taking, and theory of mind inferences about
one another (Babiloni & Astolfi, 2014). Research on the
trust game has shown that small changes in the experi-
mental protocols, such as framing effects, can have an
impact on the behavior of both players in the lab
(Johnson & Mislin, 2011). For instance, Burnham et al.
(2000) created frames for the two participants in a trust
game using the primes “partner” versus “opponent” and
found that the trustworthiness was higher in the partici-
pant framed as the partner. We add to this literature by
studying how framing the game as a trust versus power
game not only affects strategic deliberation in both
players but also affects their interbrain synchronicity.
The insights gained allow us to obtain a deeper under-
standing of how the framing effects of a trust game affect
how people create personal and common wealth. Such
findings might extend our understanding of how eco-
nomic actors operating within economic systems or insti-
tutions create wealth.
Research suggests that when two players play
a trust game, both undertake two kinds of strategic
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deliberations. The first is based on the idea that the
trustor faces investment risk. He sends an amount of
money from his endowment to the trustee in every
round and hopes that the trustee will honor his trust.
Whether or not the trustee honors his trust becomes
apparent when the trustee makes the initial repay-
ment (e.g., Ruff & Fehr, 2014). Both trustor and trustee
learn from their reciprocal actions, meaning they learn
to predict how much the other person will invest or
repay. Based on this learning, they decide how much
to invest or repay, and the iterative money exchanges
result in mutual wealth creation. When the trustee
honors the risk taken by the trustor, indicated by
the size of the trustee’s repayments, the striatum in
the trustor’s brain is assumed to become activated
(Ruff & Fehr, 2014). This type of brain activation is
related to rewarding experiences and arises here
because the trustor has made an accurate prediction
or has noticed that his expectations have been
exceeded. This consequently motivates the trustor to
invest even bigger amounts from his endowments,
leading to substantial earnings for each round of
this trust game.
The second strategic deliberation is based on the idea
that the two players make two complementary strategic
decisions (Hardin, 2003). The first deliberation is trusting,
defined as being “willing to show his or her vulnerability
by taking a risk; e.g., the trustee will not benefit fromme.”
The other is appraising someone’s trustworthiness, defined
as the willingness of a person (the trustee) to act favorably
toward the other person (the trustor) (Ben-Ner &
Halldorsson, 2010). It is the trustee’s responsibility to
demonstrate high trustworthiness through his benevo-
lence, social competence, and sense of obligation to reci-
procate the money being invested in him, reputation
management, and consistency, all of which is signaled
behaviorally by his repaying an amount of money that
balances or is greater than what the trustor expects to
receive (Hardin, 2003). Here, however, the trustee is never
sure how much the trustor appraises his trustworthiness.
Based on viewing the trustee’s behavioral signals (repay-
ments), the trustor can learn to trust the trustee through
a “lens of trustworthiness” (Hardin, 2003). We argue that
this dimension of trust acquired through the lens of trust-
worthiness affects the trustor’s willingness to rely on the
trustee. Ultimately this means that it takes the trustor less
effort to make strategic deliberations which motivates or
allows him to invest more in the trustee. Again, this leads
to substantial increases in earnings for each round of the
trust game.
What strategic deliberations would be involved
when the two players play the trust game framed as
a power game? We conjecture that the following will
not be salient deliberations during the power game: a)
the trustor showing trust in the trustee, b) the trustee
honoring the trust placed in them, and c) the trustee
seeking to demonstrate his trustworthiness to the trus-
tor. Rather, we conjecture both players will seek to
outsmart each other so as to create higher wealth for
themselves rather than mutual wealth, as occurs for
participants in the trust game. Speaking strategically,
the trustee has to show some trustworthiness to keep
the trustor motivated to continue investing. At the
same time, however, keeping a guileful eye on potential
earnings, the trustee will minimize his strategic efforts
to show trustworthiness and thus will show less bene-
volence, demonstrate less consistency in repayments,
and feel less obliged to reciprocate the money being
invested in him. This reduces the trustors’ ability to
predict the amounts received from the trustee as the
volatility in sending repayments will be higher than in
the trust game. In other words, the trustor has to be
constantly on the lookout for the next strategic move of
the trustee. He will not have rewarding experiences as
a function of the trustee honoring his risk-taking or
being able to predict the trustee’s repayment decisions.
Thus, the trustor focuses on creating his own wealth
rather than on mutual wealth. Hence, the earnings of
each round in the power game should be lower than in
the trust game.
The main research question of our study is: will inter-
brain synchronicity be higher when the game is framed
as a “trust game” compared to a “power game”? High
interbrain synchronicity is commonly taken as a sign of
mutual synchronized activity of the brains (Astolfi et al.,
2010; Fallani et al., 2010; Toppi et al., 2016). However, the
responses to behavioral decisions in synchronized brain
activity can only be hypothesized. For instance, some
authors have shown that coherent, statistically signifi-
cant interbrain activity develops during coordinated,
supportive behavioral action between two or more
team members (Astolfi et al., 2010; Fallani et al., 2010;
Toppi et al., 2016). When the predicted activity of the
other partner(s) becomes less stable (e.g., uncooperative
actions) interbrain activity significantly fades. The same
line of reasoning could be followed for brain processes
that subserve tasks requiring close scrutiny of the other
partner when compared to other more independent
behavior, in particular, a“ tit-for-tat task” compared to a
“defect” task (Fallani et al., 2010). In summary, evidence
from the literature suggests that cooperative behavior or
intense scrutiny of the partner could be associated with
increased interbrain activity detected by EEG signals,
mainly in frontoparietal areas. This underlying hypothesis
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founded on the previous literature in the area will be
adopted to link the EEG signals and the behavioral
responses in our experiment.
Materials and method
Participants
The Ethics Commission at Erasmus Institute for
Research in Management (ERIM) granted permission to
do the study. The trust game was pretested on three
pairs, allowing the team to fine-tune the experimental
setup. Subsequently the team began collecting data.
As gender and culture differences are known to
affect how people engage in the trust game (Buchan,
Croson, & Solnick, 2008; Croson & Buchan, 1999), only
Caucasian males living for at least five years in Europe
were recruited to participate in this study. Flyers were
handed out to students walking on campus or dropped
in the mail boxes of students living on campus. The
campus bulletin board (Euro-system) and Facebook
were also used as recruitment tools. The flyer men-
tioned that recruits would be paid €15 for their partici-
pation and could earn up to about €40. In total, 98
Caucasians living in Europe for at least five years were
recruited.
All participants had normal vision and reported having
no history of neurological disease. Written informed con-
sent was signed by all participants who were told that they
could stop with the experiments if they wanted to at any
time. Every participant was randomly assigned to play
a role as either trustor or trustee in one of the two condi-
tions, following a between-subject design. More specifi-
cally, participants were randomly matched in pairs with
one player assigned as the trustor and the other as trustee.
Next, both were assigned to one of the two conditions: the
game framed as a “trust game” versus that framed as
a “power game”. Nine pairs were excluded due to excessive
artifacts in more than half of the epochs or when it was
discovered that they misunderstood the rules of the game
(see description hereunder). This resulted in 20 effective
pairs per condition (total subjects n = 80). The mean age of
this sample was 22.76 and the SD was 3.88.
Design of experiment
Two people were assigned to be experimenters (A and
B) in the study, and another person, experimenter C,
was the lead administrator on the computer equipment
during the experiment (see Figure 1A of the experimen-
tal setup). Experimenter A always took the lead at the
beginning of all the rounds, thus securing standardiza-
tion for all the pairs.
Experimenter A invited the participants to be seated in
a waiting room and asked them to introduce themselves
to each other. This introduction served as a prompt that
during the game they were about to interact with a real
person rather than a computer. This precaution was taken
because some students might have read a bit of game
theory and anticipated that subjects could play against
a computer and not a real subject. A toss of the coin was
used to assign them to the role of trustor or trustee. They
were then asked to take a seat in one of two EEG rooms,
where experimenters A and B waited to place the caps on
their heads. The participants were always taught how to
play the game in the same way. Experimenter A visited
each participant in their own EEG room and gave both the
same detailed explanations about the rules and their
respective role. To check if the instructions were under-
stood, experimenter A asked the participants to briefly
repeat the rules and also posed specific test questions. If
experimenter A discovered that the participants did not
fully understand the rules, she explained them again. But,
during the game, if it was observed that the participants
did not understand their role in the game, they were
allowed to continue but their data were later deleted
from the sample. This was done to keep the promise
that they could earn up to €40. Then, led by experimenter
C, the participants were asked to play three practice
rounds on the computer. This step ensured that the parti-
cipants’mental efforts to learn the gamewould be kept to
a minimum during the actual experiment. After the
instruction phase, experimenters A and B left the rooms,
closing the doors behind them, thus ensuring that the
participants were alone and that no one could influence
their strategic deliberations and actions.
In the trust game condition, participants were told that
the game was called the “trust game”, and the sentence,
“you are entering a TRUST GAME”, was shown on the
screen before the game started. In the power game con-
dition, the name became “power game”, and the sen-
tence, “you are entering a POWER GAME”, was shown on
the screen before the game started. Throughout the
explanation, experimenter A never deliberately empha-
sized the name of the game, nor reminded participants to
pay extra attention to the name. Before the experiment
started, participants were asked to reflect quietly by look-
ing at a cross on the screen. This was to make them feel
relaxed and prepare themselves for the actual
experiment.
Each round began with a 500 ms fixation, then the
trustor was given an endowment of €10 and was asked
to decide how much he would like to send to the
trustee (from €0 to €10). Meanwhile, the trustee was
prompted to predict how much money the trustor
might send. A blank screen was presented for six
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seconds while both participants deliberated, and it was
followed by a decision (or prediction) screen. After the
deliberation period, the players typed their answers on
a keypad. Reaction time from the onset of decision (or
prediction) screen to button press was recorded and
used in subsequent analyses. No time limit was
imposed. After both participants entered a value, the
trustor’s amount was tripled and revealed to both par-
ticipants for three seconds. The trustee’s predictions
were recorded but not revealed to the trustor. The
trustee then thought about how much money to
repay and entered this amount. Likewise, the trustor
predicted the repayment value (with his reaction time
also recorded), but only the repayment amount, not the
prediction, was shown to both players for three sec-
onds. The game consisted of 15 rounds, which were
referred to vaguely as “several rounds” in the instruc-
tion phase (see Figure 1(b,c)). Each participant earned
€15 of their promised participation fee and 5% of their
total earnings from the game was converted into cash.
Figure 1. (a) Setup of the experiment; (b) Timeline of one round for the trustor; (c) Timeline of one round for the trustee.
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Only at the end of the game could each participant see
the total accumulated earnings on the screen.
EEG hyperscanning setup and data acquisition
Simultaneous stimuli presentation and EEG signal record-
ing were manipulated via E-prime port communication
(see Figure 1(a)). Two BioSemi 32-channel elastic head
caps connected with two separate, identical amplifiers
(BioSemi Active-Two system AD-box) were used to collect
brain signals from both participants. EEG signals were con-
tinuously digitized and recorded at a sampling rate of
512 Hz, 24-bit A/D conversion. Two active electrodes
attached to the left and right mastoids were selected as
offline reference electrodes. Vertical electro-oculogram
(VEOG) and horizontal electro-oculogram (HEOG) were
recorded by pasting two active electrodes below and
above the left eye, and to the orbital rim of both eyes.
Electrode impedance was reduced to a low level (5 kΩ)
before the formal experiment began and was maintained
for all recordings.
Before the calculation of synchronicity, EEG data were
pre-processed adopting BrainVision Analyzer 2 (Brain
Products, Gilching, Germany) offline in order to clean the
data and remove artifacts. First, EEG data were filtered with
a 0.1–45Hz bandpass filter as well as a 60 Hz notch filter.
Next, data were re-referenced to the algebraic average of
left and right mastoid channels, which were called the
digitally linkedmastoids. Then, an independent component
analysis using Gratton’s algorithm (Gratton, Coles, &
Donchin, 1983) was implemented by BrainVision Analyzer
2 to remove the artifacts caused by ocular movements.
Ocular-free EEG data were segmented from one second
before deliberation onset to the end of deliberation period
(-1 s–6 s) in the first and second deliberation period, result-
ing in 300 epochs per phase per condition. Finally, bad
epochs were removed based on the max-min criterion
(200 μV). In particular, to ensure both roles had the same
number of epochs, if the epoch was excluded from trustor
EEG dataset, the corresponding epoch was also excluded
from the trustee dataset, and vice versa. Consistent with
previous hyperscanning research by Mu, Han, and Gelfand
(2017), representative electrodes were selected as electro-
des of interest in accordance with four ROIs: frontal (F3, Fz,
F4), central (C3, Cz, C4), parietal (P3, Pz, P4), and occipital
(O1, Oz, O2).
EEG time-frequency analyses
Similar to EEG hyperscanning studies (e.g., Jahng, Kralik,
Hwang, & Jeong, 2017), time-frequency analyses were
conducted to characterize neural activities during the
task and to test the framing effect on event-related
spectral perturbation (ERSP). Artifact-free epochs from
one second before deliberation onset to six seconds
after onset were extracted and went into time-frequency
analyses. ERSP calculations were done in EEGLAB (https://
sccn.ucsd.edu/eeglab/). Default cycles [3 0.8] was
adopted. The frequency range was set from 4 to 40 Hz,
including all the frequency bands we were interested in.
One second prior to the deliberation onset was deter-
mined as the baseline for calculating spectral power.
A bootstrap method with 1000 times replicated was
used at every time point in every time-frequency band
in order to compare the ERSP magnitudes in trust game
and power game during the whole deliberation period.
Interbrain synchronicity calculation
A trial-based algorithm was adopted to calculate the
interbrain synchronicity in this study. In each condition
and each phase, around 300 trials from 20 groups
playing 15 rounds of trust game or power game were
used for the calculation. This is more than most pre-
vious studies using the same trial-based algorithm (e.g.,
Jahng et al., 2017; Pérez, Carreiras, & Duñabeitia, 2017).
The interbrain synchronicity between the trustor and
trustee was reflected by phase-locking value (PLV)
(Lachaux, Rodriguez, Martinerie, & Varela, 1999) for all
combinations of the selected electrodes. The trial-based
PLV of each electrode pair (i, j) was defined as (Burgess,
2013; Delaherche, Dumas, Nadel, & Chetouani, 2015;
Pérez et al., 2017):
PLVij ¼ 1N
XN
t¼1
expi φi tð Þφj tð Þð Þ


where N is the number of time points in each time
window, and i and j are the channels from two partici-
pants in an interacting dyad. Phase differences at each
time point φi tð Þ  φj tð Þ were estimated using the
Hilbert transform after filtering EEG data in the follow-
ing four desired frequency bands: theta (5–7 Hz), alpha
(8–13 Hz), beta (14–27 Hz) and gamma (28–40 Hz) at six
time ranges of the thinking phase (0–1 s, 1–2 s, 2–3 s,
3–4 s, 4–5 s and 5–6 s). The PLV ranges from 0 to 1,
where 0 means no interbrain synchronicity, and 1 indi-
cates perfect synchronicity of the oscillations between
two signals. In order to rule out coincidental synchro-
nicity, for each electrode combination (i and j), real
PLVrealij and 500 PLVsurrogateij obtained by surrogating
the trials of electrode j and calculating the phase-
locking value of i and shuffled j were compared. Phase-
locking statistics (PLS) was defined as the sum of
shuffled PLVsurrogateij exceeding the real PLVrealij. If the
PLS was < 5%, the original real PLV was kept, otherwise
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(PLS ≥ 5%), PLV was set to 0. Only significant (non-zero)
PLVs went into further statistical analyses. PLVs of sym-
metric electrode pairs were then averaged. Specifically,
the average value between PLVij and PLVji was calcu-
lated as the synchronicity between electrode i and elec-
trode j (Jahng et al., 2017).
Results
Behavioral results
Earnings each round
A 2 (condition: trust game and power game) x 2 (role:
trustor and trustee) repeated measures ANOVA was used
to explore the framing and role effect on earnings for each
round. The salient effects of both factors were found (con-
dition: F (1,598) = 3.984, p = 0.046; role: F (1,598) = 8.021,
p = 0.005), indicating that participants earnedmoremoney
in the trust game (M = 13.563, SD = 3.981) than in the
power game (M = 13.067, SD = 4.404), and the trustor
(M = 13.647, SD = 3.332) earned more money than the
trustee (M = 12.983, SD = 4.903). However, no significant
interaction between condition and role was observed (F
(1,598) = 1.752, p = 0.186) (Figure 2).
Reaction time
Participant’s reaction time, defined as the duration from
onset of the answer screen to button press, after thinking
about their predictions and decisions on how much to
invest/repay was analyzed to explore the differences
between the two conditions. Thirty-four trials in the trust
game and 39 trials in the power gamewere identified to be
outliers as they fell beyond the range mean ± 2 * standard
deviation. In particular, if a trial was judged as an outlier, the
corresponding trial of the other participant from the same
group, as well as the trial in the other phase, were also
excluded. Reaction time data without outliers were then
assigned in a 2 (condition: trust game and power game) × 2
(phase: invest phase and repay phase) x 2 (role: trustor and
trustee) three-way repeated measures ANOVA with condi-
tion as a between-subject factor, and phase and role as
within-subject factors. Results revealed a salient three-way
interaction effect between condition, phase, and role on
reaction time (F (1, 525) =12.852, p<0.001). Further analysis
of the three-way interaction was conducted to explore the
effect of different conditions on reaction time. In the trust
game, the statistical result confirmed a significant phase
x role interaction effect (F (1,265) = 8.884, p = 0.003).
Besides, the main effect of the role was also observed
(F (1, 265) = 93.854, p < 0.001), indicating the trustee’s
reaction time was longer before making decisions
(Mtrustor = 2501.564, SDtrustor = 1422.904;
Mtrustee = 3634.628, SDtrustee = 2176.228). The longer reac-
tion time before the trustee made a decision was salient in
both phases (invest phase: Mtrustor-trustee = −859.177,
t=−5.477,p<0.001; repayphase:Mtrustor-trustee=−1409.951,
t =−10.040, p < 0.001) (Figure 3(a)). The results indicate that
it always took the trustee longer to answer, no matter
whether he was asked to decide or predict. In the power
game, a significant phase x role interaction effect
(F (1,260) = 38.327, p < 0.001) on reaction time was also
revealed. Unlike in the trust game, the trustor in the power
game spent longer deciding on the amount of money to
invest than the trustee spent predicting how much he
would receive (Mtrustor-trustee = 431.394, t = 2.779,
p = 0.006), while in the repay phase, it took the trustee
longer to decide how much to repay than the trustor to
predict how much to receive (Mtrustor-trustee = −1322.364,
t = −5.163, p < 0.001) (Figure 3(b)).
Prediction accuracy
Prediction accuracy is reflected by the absolute difference
between predicting howmuch to receive/repay and decid-
ing the amount of money to send/repay, whichmeans that
the greater the difference between the predicted amount
received/repaid and the real amount sent/repaid, the lower
Figure 2. Earnings of each round in trust versus power game (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001).
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the prediction accuracy. The results of a 2 (condition: trust
game and power game) × 2 (phase: invest phase and repay
phase) repeated measures ANOVA revealed the pro-
nounced main effects of both condition (F (1,
1196) = 4.998, p = 0.026) and phase (F (1, 1196) = 7.825,
p = 0.005), indicating that participants predicted the
exchanged amount of money more accurately in the trust
game than the power game (Mtrust = 1.227, SDtrust = 2.490;
Mpower = 1.557, SDpower = 2.645), and trustors did better
than trustees in money prediction no matter the condition
(Minvest = 1.598, SDinvest = 2.560; Mrepay = 1.185,
SDrepay = 2.571). No significant interaction effect between
condition and phase was observed based on the ANOVA
results (p = 0.095) (Figure 4).
EEG time-frequency results
In order to gauge interbrain synchronicity, we first con-
ducted a time-frequency analysis (Jahng et al., 2017).
Figure 5 (below) shows significant differences (p ≤ 0.001)
in blue, while insignificant ones are shown in yellow.
Greater ERSP magnitudes of power game versus trust
game were found in alpha and gamma band at 1–2 s
time interval, beta and gamma band at both 2–3 s and
3–4 s time intervals. Brain activity was observed to be
greater only in alpha band at the 4–5 s time interval.
Baseline and the 5–6 s time interval were cut short after
the time-frequency transformation and did not go into
statistical analyses. Using time-frequency analyses, we
aimed to test how the framing effect modulated ERSP
magnitudes in different frequency bands at different time
intervals.
Interbrain synchronicity
We calculated interbrain synchronicity from the fre-
quency bands and time intervals, which showed signif-
icant ERSP magnitude differences between the trust
game and power game.
PLVs ranging from 0–1 were used to measure the
connectivity between two brains across time and aver-
aged based on brain regions for further analysis. As the
Figure 3. (a) Reaction time of trustor and trustee in the trust game; (b) Reaction time of trustor and trustee in the power game
(*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001).
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missions in both invest and repay phases were similar,
except that the decider in the invest phase turned into
the predictor in the repay phase, we first ran a t-test for
PLVs from the invest and repay phases within a 1–2 s
time window to test the differences between two
phases. The false discovery rate (FDR) procedure was
adopted to correct p-values for multiple comparisons
(Zoefel & VanRullen, 2016). No significant difference
was observed in any of the electrode combinations
(corrected p > 0.05). PLVs from these two phases were
then merged and went into the comparison between
conditions. Mixed ANOVA was adopted in all frequency
bands, with condition (trust versus power game) as
a between-subject factor and electrode combination
(78 combinations) as a within-subject factor. The salient
effect of condition (F (1, 1066) = 4.736, p = 0.032) was
observed only in the alpha band (1–2 s) (see Table 1).
The interaction effect between channels and condition
appeared only in the beta band at the 3–4 s time
interval. However, a further t-test with FDR correction
showed almost no significant PLV difference between
two conditions in channel pairs, so only the salient
condition effect in alpha band was plotted and went
into discussion. Figure 6 (below) shows that alpha band
Figure 4. Prediction accuracy in the trust versus power game (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001).
Figure 5. ERSP magnitudes in trust game versus power game, separately, differences between two games and significant statistical
difference (alpha level 0.001).
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PLV (1–2 s) was substantially higher in the power game
than the trust game. A subsequent independent t-test
revealed the framing effect in different electrode com-
binations (FDR corrected). These significant electrode
combinations were mainly in the prefrontal and central
regions (Figure 7).
Discussion
Trust between economic actors is a key factor in society
and affects whether and how economic actors can build
wealth in a world in which people can compete or
cooperate (Ostrom & Walker, 2003). The iterative trust
game is a prolifically used tool that exemplifies how
participants (two economic actors) learn about each
other’s economic strategies and build trust accordingly,
and how this in turn effects wealth creation. We studied
the strategic deliberations of both participants as well
as their interbrain synchronicity to deepen our under-
standing of how people engage in wealth creation.
Knowing that trust games are sensitive to design fac-
tors such as framing effects, we framed the economic
experiment as a “trust game” and a “power game”
(Burnham et al., 2000; Johnson & Mislin, 2011). We
conjectured that this framing would substantially affect
the strategic deliberations of both trustor and trustee
Table 1. Between-subject effects and interactions of condition × electrode pair from the frequency bands and time intervals with
significant ERSP magnitude differences (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001).
Frequency band Time interval Between-subject effects Interactions of condition × electrode
alpha (8–13 Hz) 1–2 s p = 0.032 (*) p = 0.717
4–5 s p = 0.666 p = 0.172
beta (14–27 Hz) 2–3 s p = 0.155 p = 0.661
3–4 s p = 0.145 p = 0.001(*)
gamma (28–40 Hz) 1–2 s p = 0.306 p = 0.583
2–3 s p = 0.846 p = 0.494
3–4 s p = 0.968 p = 0.465
Figure 6. Average PLV in trust versus power game (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001).
Figure 7. Differences in alpha band-interbrain synchronicity (corrected p < 0.05).
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and would be associated with differences in EEG time-
frequency results and in interbrain synchronicity.
Briefly stated: in the trust game framed as a “trust
game” the trustor mainly tests the trustee because a)
the trustor faces more risk and so needs to study the
trustee’s intentions to predict whether the trustee will
repay his investments; b) when the trustor’s predic-
tions are correct or exceeded (more money is repaid
than predicted) he will experience a feeling of
reward; and c) the trustor will view the repayment
decisions through the lens of the trustee’s trust-
worthiness. These strategic deliberations affect his
willingness to rely on the trustee and make invest-
ment decisions accordingly, all of which result in
creating both his own wealth and their collective
wealth. The roles substantially change when the
trust game is framed as a “power game” because
now, in their deliberations, both players behave
antagonistically as they seek or are required to out-
smart each other and thus keep a strategic eye on
creating their own wealth rather than on collecting
mutual wealth.
The experiment delivered three important observa-
tions. First, as expected, the earnings of each round
were higher in the trust game than in the power game.
Note that the trustor benefited mostly from wealth crea-
tion in both conditions. Framing (trust versus power) had
no effect on either the roles taken or wealth creation. In
other words, the data show that the trustor was the main
beneficiary, no matter the framing condition.
Second, the reaction time taken to ponder decisions
and predict investments or repayments showed differ-
ent patterns in both games. In the trust game, the
trustee took longer than the trustor to predict both
how much money he would receive and how much
he would repay. However, in the power game, the
trustee only took longer to deliberate how much to
repay while the trustor took more time to decide how
much to invest in the trustee.
Third, the prediction accuracy was higher in the trust
game than the power game. In other words, as we pro-
posed, better prediction brings about more trust and
a greater sense of reward, which results in the willingness
to make higher investments. Note, however, that in both
the trust and power games, the trustor was better at
predicting the repayments made. In addition, no interac-
tion effects (condition and role) were found.
All observations (higher earnings for each round of the
trust game, longer reaction time for the trustee in the
invest/repay phase of the trust game, higher prediction
accuracy in the trust game and better prediction accuracy
by the trustor no matter what game or condition) lead us
to conjecture that in the trust game the trustee takes
more responsibility for ensuring that trust builds between
the players such that more common wealth can be cre-
ated. In contrast, in the power game the trustor’s longer
reaction time for investment decisions and better predic-
tion accuracy for repayments indicates that he might
devise a strategic mindset to gain more wealth on the
back of the goodwill of the trustee, given that the latter’s
repayment reaction time was longer than the trustor’s
prediction reaction time.
In short, these observations lead us to conclude that
the trust game framed as a trust game versus power
game substantially affects people’s strategic delibera-
tions. Importantly, it allows us to understand our find-
ings on the differences in interbrain synchronicity
between the two games. In the trust game, the trustee
takes longer to think about both the investment
received and the repayment sum to be sent to the
trustor. Added to that, the trustor’s better prediction
accuracy about the repayments allows him to rely on
the trustee as well as to experience the pleasure of
having his trust honored and being able to appraise
the trustee through the lens of trustworthiness.
However, when framed as a power game, the way in
which both players deliberated strategically changed sub-
stantially: the trustor spentmore time deciding howmuch
to invest so as to attain higher earnings himself while the
trustee had to keep the game going, in terms of both
wondering “how much will I get?” to a certain extent, due
to the trustor’s intense strategizing, and in thinking stra-
tegically about howmuch to repay. This showed up espe-
cially in the lower prediction accuracy in the power game
as opposed to the trust game. Both accounts of strategic
deliberations in the trust and power games help explain
why interbrain synchronicity was higher in the power
game than in the trust game. This finding, we believe, is
our contribution to the literature on interbrain synchroni-
city, which has become an important stream of research
today given that the human base line has a rich social
foundation rather than merely reflecting individuality in
an observer or appraiser of facial expressions of conspe-
cifics (e.g., Babiloni & Astolfi, 2014; Dumas et al., 2010).
As discussed, the strategic deliberations of trustor
and trustee performed key roles in the trust game and
so these periods were chosen to measure interbrain
synchronicity. A closer look at the differences in inter-
brain synchronicity between the two conditions shows
that they occurred especially between the electrodes in
frontal and central regions. These regions are asso-
ciated with prefrontal activation, and this in turn is
known to be involved in human decision-making
(Miller & Cohen, 2001; Tang et al., 2015). Several authors
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have proposed that when people deliberate strategi-
cally in economic games, their prefrontal cortex activa-
tions play key roles (e.g., Sanfey et al., 2003). Concretely,
these strategic deliberations involve perspective-taking
or theory of mind inferences, when predicting how
much money to receive or, particularly applicable to
the trustee, the suppression of overly selfish behavior
(Balconi & Pagani, 2014; Ruby & Decety, 2004).
Apparently these strategic deliberations are more syn-
chronous during the power game than in the trust
game. Again, during the power game both participants
were seeking to outsmart each other, which requires
mutual, intense perspective-taking efforts, while in the
trust game the trustor can rely on the trustworthiness
of the trustee, whom we believe undertook more effort
to show his trustworthiness or refrain from being
opportunistic. Hence these interbrain synchronicity
findings match well with the main conjectures made
in our paper. Finally, it is important to note that inter-
brain synchronicity takes place at the alpha bands
which are known to be related to socially strategic
deliberations (e.g., Astolfi et al., 2010; Tognoli et al.,
2007).
It may seem counterintuitive that interbrain synchroni-
city is higher in the power game than the trust game. After
all, friendships and other relationships between people are
known to show high interbrain synchronicity (Goldstein,
Weissman-Fogel, Dumas, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2018). Note,
however, that interpersonal relationships function to pro-
vide all partners in the relationship affection, pleasure, and
stress relief. Herewemust emphasize that in the trust game
under study, both players face high opportunity costs if
their strategic deliberations do not benefit each other. One
or both face a loss of money if they do not learn the other
person’s strategy, or whether they can rely on the other
person’s trust, which is especially the case for the trustor.
Concretely, in our experiment they can lose or earn about
€40, a significant amount for most students, especially
given the short period of time needed to complete the
experiment and their low student budget. Of course,
beyond monetary gain, pride and reputation gains are
also rewarding.
Although this may be a leap of faith, we cannot
refrain from pondering that the trustee in the trust
game also functions like a banker who has to take
responsibility for his customers’ trust that his bank is
a reliable place to invest their money in. Ultimately,
trustworthiness between economic actors, such as
two individuals or an individual’s interaction with
an institution, and the consequent effort to demon-
strate trustworthiness by individuals, firms, or insti-
tutions are what foster common wealth creation in
society (Fukuyama, 1995). Again, our conclusions are
inferred especially from our study of interbrain syn-
chronicity: in the power game, both players work to
outsmart each other and thus show high interbrain
synchronicity, while in the trust game the trustee
allows the trustor to rely on him (i.e., trust him)
and this shows up in lower interbrain synchronicity.
Limitations of the study
This study focused on two related questions: does framing
a trust game influence how trustor and trustee engage in
strategic deliberations and how in turn does this relate to
differences in interbrain synchronicity based on EEG
hyperscanning. Other hyperscanning techniques are avail-
able these days, such as hyperscanning fMRI (e.g., Hasson
et al., 2012). This study could be replicated using the latter
neuroscientific method. We could have chosen to use
hyperscanning fMRI or even both methods to study
whether the trustor has higher activation in his striatum
when the trustee honors his investments or matches his
predictions in the trust game. Indeed, while EEG has much
to offer in studies of temporal resolution it has less value in
spatial resolution, whereas fMRI offers just the opposite
benefits. EEG, however, is more convenient and less expen-
sive to implement.
Second, in this study the participants were seated in
two separate rooms and could not see each other’s
faces. Yet facial expression is known to affect people’s
strategic deliberations (e.g., Scharlemann, Eckel,
Kacelnik, & Wilson, 2001). These days, with the avail-
ability of mobile hyper-EEG (e.g., EMOTIV), it is in prin-
ciple possible to study economic games when people
are in close proximity (Babiloni & Astolfi, 2014).
Third, the participants in the experiment were limited
to Caucasian males and excluded females and people
from other ethnic backgrounds (e.g., Asians, blacks) or
cultural backgrounds (North/South America, East
Europe). Actually, these variables could significantly influ-
ence strategic deliberations during the game (Ben-Ner &
Halldorsson, 2010). Future replications should create
a variety of strategically chosen stratified samples (e.g.,
placing a male and female together or placing people
from different cultural backgrounds together) in order to
check whether these variables influence the effect of
framing on strategic deliberation and interbrain synchro-
nicity found in our research.
Fourth, as it has become easier to use biomarkers such
as hormones or genetic markers we could have studied
whether, for example, participants produce more testos-
terone in the power game as opposed to the trust game
(e.g., Zak et al., 2009) or whether individual genetic
makeup matters (e.g., Cesarini et al., 2008). Most impor-
tantly, we could have studied whether endocrinal or
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genetic variables are associated with interbrain synchro-
nicity. In addition, we could have used self-reports after
the game or after each round during the game in order to
gauge people’s strategic intentions and moves, which
could or should differ across the two conditions. This
could be investigated in future studies.
Conclusions
Our study focused on how framing the trust game as
a “trust game” versus “power game” affects the strategic
deliberations of trustor and trustee and how this in turn is
associated with differences in interbrain synchronicity.
While cooperation is intuitively associated with higher
interbrain synchronicity, here we find that when people
play the trust game framed as a “power game”, interbrain
synchronicity is higher than when framed as a trust game.
The main lesson that can be drawn from this finding is
that the trust emerging between players in a trust game
framed as a “trust game”, indicated by higher earnings for
each round, is due to the fact that the trustee engages in
more intense strategic deliberation efforts to imbue trust
in the game, and the trustor is able to rely on this trust
with less need for ongoing monitoring, reflected in addi-
tional synchronicity. This especially benefits the trustor
who, as he can rely on the trustee, will therefore attain
better prediction accuracy about repayments. It also moti-
vates him to invest (more) in the trustee; hence the occur-
rence of lower interbrain synchronicity. In the power
game, however, both actors seek to outsmart each other
which paradoxically affects their interbrain synchronicity
positively, largely due to a greater need for joint vigilance
concerning each other.
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